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WI L L I A M V. DU N L A P
____________________
A Living Constitution
and a Living Bill of Rights
Two hundred and eighteen years ago last week, fifty-five
members of the Continental Congress met for one last time to sign
a document that was originally supposed to have been a few
proposed amendments to the Articles of Confederation. Instead, the
delegates had drafted a whole new Constitution, four handwritten
pages that would serve as a blueprint for a government the likes of
which the world had never seen. Four years later, the new Congress
and the states added ten amendments to that Constitution. Nine
were designed to protect individual rights and liberties against
government intrusion, and the tenth was to protect the fledgling
federal system, to clarify the line between national and state
authority. Again, the world had never seen anything like it.1
This year, for the first time, Constitution Day is being observed
around the country, at every college and university, to help instill in
students and faculty alike the significance of those events of 1787
and the impact that they still carry today. I am pleased and honored
to be invited back to Sacred Heart University to speak at this first
Constitution Day lecture. I was here three years ago to talk about
the Patriot Act in your excellent series of discussions on Democracy
and the War on Terror, and was truly impressed by the level of
interest and the quality of the student involvement. The fact that
————————
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this university has just created a new Department of Government
and Politics, which is sponsoring this program, shows that the
interest of three years ago was not just a flash in the pan and that
enough students are interested and involved in the important fields
of government and politics and political science to justify the new
department and support its programs. It speaks well for the future
of American civil society that students are willing to devote their
university years to studying and staying aware of the important
issues of the day.
The Constitution that we celebrate today is a living
Constitution, and by that I mean two very different things. First,
when I say that we have a living Constitution, I mean to take sides
in a fundamentally confused—and confusing—debate swirling
around the widely misunderstood concepts of original intent and
judicial activism. I also mean that, whatever side you may take in
that debate and whatever you may think of the outcome of
individual cases in our judicial system, the Constitution is living in
the sense that it is at the core of daily debates and decisions at every
level of every branch of government, that it is intertwined in our
daily lives in ways that most people never notice.
The first part of this talk will discuss the often acrimonious
debate today over original intent and the living Constitution. The
second part will be a very brief survey of the Bill of Rights—a small
but crucially important part of the Constitution—and the central
role it continues to play in today’s civic society.
The Living Constitution
The question of the Living Constitution versus Original Intent
is an acrimonious and often unenlightening debate that appears
daily on AM talk radio (both the left and right varieties), on the Fox
News Network, and, during confirmation hearings on Supreme
Court nominations, everywhere you look. In short, the debate (if
there is one) is between those who say that we have a living
Constitution, one that must endure for the ages and therefore be
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flexible and responsive to changing times and conditions, and
those who argue that we have an amendment process to deal with
changing times and conditions and that the task of judges is to
interpret and apply the Constitution, until it is formally
amended, in light of the intent of the framers or the original
meaning of the text. In reality, though, no one today really wants
to go back to the original intent or meaning to decide cases in
today’s federal courts.
This is not to say that there are no originalists around, people
who take the language and meaning of the Constitution seriously.
Most of them will admit, and do admit, however, that searching for
the intent of the framers is a fundamentally misguided and
ultimately an impossible task. Furthermore, those few who may still
claim to follow original intent can be seen to stray off that path
when it suits their purposes.
One of the ironies of the debate is that the framers apparently
intended ours to be a living, adaptable constitution. How else can
one explain the presence in the Bill of Rights of such open-ended
and relativist phrases as “due process of law,” “unreasonable searches
and seizures,” and “cruel and unusual punishment.”
That aside, why do I say a search for original intent is
impossible? First of all, how can we know the intent of people who
drafted this document more than two centuries ago? Second, how
can a group of people—or in this case, many groups of people—
have an intent? And which people do we mean? Do we examine the
intent of those who drafted the language at the Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia? Or the intent of those who debated
and ratified the Constitution in the several state legislatures? Do we
have reason to believe that any two of them had precisely the same
intent? And what of the dissenters? Do we consider their intent as
well? Who are, or were, “We the People,” who ordained and
established the Constitution in the first place?
There is a strong tendency to rely on the famous and still
influential Federalist Papers, drafted by James Madison, Alexander
Hamilton, and John Jay, as evidence of the intent of the framers.2
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Many seem to forget that these were written as part of a very public
debate on whether to ratify the Constitution, and that they
represented one side of that debate. The fact that their side
prevailed, in the adoption of the new Constitution, does not
necessarily mean that the states ratified it for the reasons Madison,
Hamilton, and Jay pressed forward.
Justice Antonin Scalia and Professor Randy Barnett of Boston
College Law School are probably the two staunchest originalists
today, and both agree that a search for original intent is impossible.
They would turn instead to original meaning—how a provision
would have been understood at the time it was drafted and ratified.
This is a somewhat more practical enterprise, but it still has
problems; courts often have difficulty ascertaining what Congress or
a state legislature meant by a word or phrase just a year or so earlier.
As Justice Scalia described originalism: “It’s not always easy to figure
out what the provision meant when it was adopted. I don’t say its
perfect. I just say it’s better than anything else.”3
This is where many would disagree. Lets look at where a true
originalist approach would lead us. Brown v. Board of Education,4
which declared racially segregated school systems to be
unconstitutional, clearly went against both the original intent and
the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection clause, but does anyone seriously believe today that the
Constitution allows racially segregated schools? Or that Brown v.
Board should be overruled? Take Bolling v. Sharpe,5 the companion
case to Brown that held that the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment, which applies to the federal government, prohibited
segregated schools in the District of Columbia. This decision is
probably even further from the original intent and meaning than
Brown, yet it is so obviously correct that no one seriously questions
it today.6 Baker v. Carr7 and Reynolds v. Sims8 brought us the one
person, one vote rule that did away with perennially imbalanced state
legislatures which, after the migration from farm to factory in the
early twentieth century, gave residents of rural counties in some
cases twenty times the representation of city dwellers in the state
A LIVING CONSTITUTION AND A LIVING BILL OF RIGHTS 21
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legislature, along with (and this was the real Catch-22) the power to
prevent the imbalance from ever being corrected. The courts
stepped in to correct the imbalance, using the equal protection
clause in a way never contemplated by its framers. Loving v. Virginia
struck down a law that prohibited marriage between races. If the
drafters of the equal protection clause did not intend or mean
that—and they did not—was Loving wrongly decided? Should it be
overruled? It is true that we have a procedure for amending the
Constitution, but when a small minority can prevent an
overwhelming majority from amending the Constitution to
integrate schools or to assure democratic legislatures or to allow
interracial marriage, are the courts wrong to interpret the equal
protection clause more broadly than its drafters and adopters may
have contemplated?
When Justice Scalia and Professor Barnett and Justice Clarence
Thomas talk of originalism, they are engaged in a legitimate and
good faith search for principles of constitutional and statutory
interpretation. Without principles, judicial decision-making is just
political lawmaking by unelected judges. These originalists want—
as everyone, I think, wants—principled restraints on judicial
discretion. Originalism, they would argue, provides not only a
legitimate theory of interpretation but also, perhaps more
important, restraint, because it limits a judge’s discretion. Living
Constitutionalists, they might say, are free to choose from any
number of current trends or philosophies or even laws of other
countries in deciding what the Constitution means, while
originalists are bound by the original text or intent or meaning. The
difficulty with this is not only that original meaning is far vaguer
and more elusive than most originalists would admit, but that so-
called originalist judges are as good as living Constitutionalists at
picking and choosing. They are cafeteria originalists, one might say.
Justice Scalia has consistently argued for First Amendment
protection for commercial speech in the absence of any evidence of
which I am aware that the framers intended this or that any of them
thought that this was what freedom of speech meant. Personally, I
WILLIAM V. DUNLAP22
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do not object to reading the First Amendment broadly and
protecting speech today that the framers might not have intended
to protect, but shouldn’t Justice Scalia object?
The Constitution has two due process clauses. One, in the Fifth
Amendment and applicable to the federal government, became part
of the Constitution in 1791.9 The other, in the Fourteenth
Amendment, became part of the Constitution in 1868.10 They use
the same language to describe the rights protected, yet is there any
reason to believe that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment
meant in 1868 precisely what the drafters of the Fifth Amendment
meant in 1791? If we were to discover that they had somewhat, or
radically, different views of what due process meant, would we then
apply different standards depending on which clause was at issue?
Can the 1791 drafters control what their successors meant in 1868?
Surely we could not apply the 1868 view to an earlier generation.
Would it make any sense in today’s world to treat the two due
process clauses as though they mean different things? Should they
both mean what due process of law means today?
Here’s the other problem. Scholars and judges aside, the phrase
original intent, like the phrase “activist judges” when used
pejoratively in talk shows and newspaper columns, is not a theory
or a principle. It has become a political code phrase to indicate
decisions or judges that go against a particular political viewpoint.
After the United States Supreme Court, in Bush v. Gore,11 interfered
with a recount ordered by the state Supreme Court in Florida by
using the equal protection clause in a way that the framers of clause
certainly never contemplated, I never heard any of the usual
original intent or original meaning advocates, including Justices
Scalia and Thomas, who helped decide that case take the Supreme
Court, or themselves, to task for a brand new reading of that
venerable clause.
So the principle isn’t really that much of a principle, the
practical argument fails in practice, and I know of no originalists
who would want to live with the results of a true originalist
application of, say, the equal protection clause.
A LIVING CONSTITUTION AND A LIVING BILL OF RIGHTS 23
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The Living Bill of Rights
Let us turn our attention now our living Bill of Rights, to
sketch a few of the issues and controversies in America today that
have been, or soon will be, decided—probably only temporarily—
with the help of the Bill of Rights. This is not intended to be a
definitive discussion of the Bill of Rights—just a reminder that it
still plays a significant role in our daily lives.
Before we talk about the first ten amendments, perhaps we
should start with the fourteenth, without which the Bill of Rights
would be a much weaker document.
Amendment XIV
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
*     *     *     *     *
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
When the Bill of Rights was adopted, and for many decades
afterward, it applied only to the national government, not to the
states. It did not have to be this way. Only the First Amendment
makes any reference to either level of government: “Congress shall
make no law . . .” The others declare that individuals have rights and
liberties that may not be infringed but do not specify who, or what,
may not infringe them. Before this issue had been clarified, a
WILLIAM V. DUNLAP24
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Baltimore dock owner sued the city for damages allegedly inflicted
on his dock by a harbor improvement project. The Supreme Court,
in 1833, in a case called Barron v. Baltimore,12 held that the Fifth
Amendments takings clause, and by implication the other pro-
isions of the Bill of Rights, applied only to the national government,
not to state and local governments.
Then in 1868, Congress and the states amended the
Constitution once again, with the Fourteenth Amendment. This
was the second of three known as the Civil War, or post-Civil War,
amendments. The Thirteenth, in 1865, prohibited slavery and
involuntary servitude (except as punishment for a crime).13 When
this did not end racial discrimination in the former Confederacy,
the Fourteenth Amendment declared that all persons born in the
United States, which included nearly every former slave, were
citizens of the United States and of the state in which they resided.
It also included three clauses designed to protect individual rights
and liberties from abuse by the states. These were the due process
clause, identical to one in the Fifth Amendment; the privileges or
immunities clause, to protect citizens of the United States against
abuse by the states; and the equal protection clause, originally to
protect former slaves against discrimination but now interpreted far
more broadly to prevent many forms of discrimination. (The third
Civil War amendment was the Fifteenth,14 which prohibited racial
discrimination in voting.)
Eventually, the court began to use these clauses to apply various
provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states. In 1897, the right to
just compensation was found to be protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.15 In 1927, the free speech
clause was applied to the states.16 Then came freedom of the press,17
freedom of assembly,18 assistance of counsel in capital cases,19 later in
all felony cases,20 protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures,21 self-incrimination,22 and double jeopardy,23 until by the end
of the 1970s, the Supreme Court had incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment virtually every provision of the Bill of Rights,
so that they applied similarly to the state and federal governments.
A LIVING CONSTITUTION AND A LIVING BILL OF RIGHTS 25
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So we see that the due process clause, through which most of
these provisions were incorporated against the states, has been most
influential. The privileges or immunities clause, which could have
been very useful in protecting the rights of citizens against state
abuse, was very quickly gutted by the Supreme Court and restricted
to protecting a few rights guaranteed by the United Constitution to
United States citizens—rights that states were seldom inclined to
infringe in the first place, such as the right to travel freely from state
to state or to petition Congress.24 A few years ago, in a case involving
California’s lower welfare payments to new state residents, the court,
most unusually, relied on this privileges and immunities clause to
strike down the California law, possibly breathing new life into the
clause.25
The third—the equal protection clause—has revolutionized
civil society in America. It has not come even close to undoing racial
and gender inequities in many aspects of life, but it has done away
with legally segregated schools, buses, restrooms, restaurants, water
fountains, and swimming pools, and paved the way for
congressional legislating prohibiting racial discrimination in
employment and places of public accommodation. Even though the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may not have intended so,
the equal protection clause has also prohibited official gender
discrimination and some state-imposed disabilities on aliens and
children born out of wedlock. The clause, along with its
counterparts in various state constitutions, also plays a role in the
current debate over gender orientation and same-sex marriage.
So today, as we talk about the Bill of Rights, keep in mind how
much we owe to the Fourteenth Amendment for the protections we
enjoy under the first ten.
Establishment of Religion
The very first clause of the Bill of Rights is at the heart of three
of the most contentious disputes of the day: whether crèches and
the Ten Commandments may be displayed on public property,
WILLIAM V. DUNLAP26
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whether the pledge of allegiance, with the phrase “under God,” may
be mandated in public schools, and whether the teaching of
evolution in science classes may be banned or regulated.
Amendment I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances.
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . . .” This is much more than a simple ban on an official
religion or church, such as the Church of England, from which
many of the early American settlers had fled. The establishment
clause is said to erect a wall of separation between church and state,
to avoid excessive entanglement between church and state,26 and has
been used to prevent public funding of church-related schools,27
public prayer at high school football games,28 and the display of
religious symbols in public buildings.29
The Pledge of Allegiance. Not long ago, a federal judge in
California ordered a school district to stop requiring students to
recite the Pledge of Allegiance each morning in school.30 He did not,
despite numerous press reports to the contrary, declare the Pledge,
or the congressional act that inserted the words “under God” into it,
unconstitutional. He found that to force students who did not
believe in God to choose between reciting the words, standing
silently by, or leaving the room put them in a position of either
professing something they did not believe or appearing to be
unpatriotic. Reciting the Pledge is, after all, essentially a patriotic,
not a religious, exercise, an unconstitutional entanglement of
church and state, say the plaintiffs in the Newdow cases. This case
has already been to the United States Supreme Court,31 which
dismissed it on a procedural issue: that the father bringing the suit
A LIVING CONSTITUTION AND A LIVING BILL OF RIGHTS 27
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on behalf of his daughter was not the custodial parent and so did
not have standing. This time, the same father—who happens to be
a lawyer—brought the case on behalf of other school children; the
court found that they did have standing and proceeded to rule in
their favor on the principal issues. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has already ruled against the school board once.32 If it
does so again, the Supreme Court will not have to hear the appeal—
it has almost total control over its docket and can decline to hear
most cases without providing a reason—but because another Court
of Appeals, the Fourth Circuit, has ruled the other way in a virtually
identical Virginia case,33 this split among the circuits would
ordinarily assure that the Supreme Court would take the case to
avoid a situation in which the United States Constitution is being
interpreted and applied differently in different parts of the country.
The Ten Commandments. Just last spring, the Supreme Court
handed down a split decision on the Ten Commandments, allowing
a public display in Texas to stand but finding that one in Kentucky
violated the establishment clause. The court, Justice Breyer in
particular, was criticized, even ridiculed, by many media
commentators for not being able to decide whether the
Constitution permits displays of the Ten Commandments. Upon
closer analysis, however, Justice Breyer’s reasoned opinions and the
eventual outcome in the Court should make perfect sense, even to
those who disagree with the outcome of one or the other of the
cases, as most people appear to do. Sometimes—when the
commandments are displayed as part of a larger display of social,
historical, philosophical, and cultural values—they do not
constitute an establishment of religion. When they are displayed on
government property in an effort to promote or celebrate the Judeo-
Christian tradition, however, this entangles government too closely
with religion and is forbidden. Rather than say that all displays are
permitted, or that all displays are prohibited, the court looked at the
individual circumstances of each display to make a case-by-case
determination. That is what courts do best, and it is a sure sign of
an evolving Constitution and a living Bill of Rights.
WILLIAM V. DUNLAP28
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Speaking of evolving. The third contentious establishment clause
issue today is the conflict over the teaching of human evolution in the
public schools. The political agenda of the anti-evolution movement is
to take it out of the First Amendment arena by trying to disguise the fact
this is largely a religious effort with scriptural roots. We seldom hear the
word “creationism” any more. The new program is “intelligent design,”
a pseudo-science packaged as science, so that critics of evolution can try
to justify requiring science teachers to present it alongside evolution in
public school classrooms. At the moment this is a political issue, just
beginning to work its way through the courts. Eventually it will probably
reach the United States Supreme Court, and this—along with the
abortion issue—is one of the reasons that evangelical Christians, among
others, have made the selection of federal judges, especially justices of the
Supreme Court, such a high priority in their political agenda.
And that’s just the first clause of the First Amendment. The
amendment also contains the free exercise clause, which is now in the
courts through cases as disparate as whether prison inmates have a right
to special diets and to chaplains from their own sect of Islam, and
whether Congress has the power to exempt churches from the municipal
planning and zoning laws that regulate land use by homes and businesses.
Freedom of Speech
Laws punishing flag burning violate the free speech clause, the
Supreme Court has held. So now a Flag Burning Amendment, the
latest of many, has been introduced in Congress, to overrule the
Court and to take burning the American flag outside the protection
of the First Amendment. This is just one of many free speech cases
in the courts today.
Freedom of the Press
Even though the press has its own clause, the Court has never
granted it significant protections that the public does not already
enjoy through its freedom of speech. Judith Miller of the New York
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Times was sent to federal jail for refusing to divulge the name of her
source of information about Valerie Plame, the CIA covert operative
whose identify was outed by the White House and former CNN
commentator Robert Novak in retaliation for her husbands
criticism of President Bush's Iraq police.34
Press shield laws pose a truly difficult balancing of interests and
values. Press advocates regard access to information about how
government or large corporations actually go about their business as
a cornerstone of a free and effective press, and they fear that if
reporters have no privilege to protect confidential sources their
information will dry up. Prosecutors argue that the reporters
frequently have information relating to the commission of a crime
and that reporters, like everyone else, have a legal obligation to assist
prosecutors. Sometimes it even becomes a clash of constitutional
rights. Even if you agree that reporters should have a privilege to
protect confidential sources, suppose the information being
withheld would assist a defendant in a criminal case. Then we have
a direct conflict between the reporters’ First Amendment claim and
the defendants’ right to a fair trial, specifically the Sixth
Amendment right to compel witnesses to testify.
In the face of such a conflict, one occasionally hears the
argument that the First Amendment should prevail over any other,
that it is in first place because the framers obviously considered
freedom of speech and the other rights related to expression to be
the most important. In fact, what we call the First Amendment was
actually third in a list of twelve articles of amendment submitted by
Congress to the states in 1789. The first, a technical formula for
determining the number of representatives, was never ratified.35 The
second, prohibiting senators and representatives from raising their
own salaries, took more than two hundred years to gain the
necessary ratifications, becoming the Twenty-Seventh Amendment
in 1992.36 Thus the amendment’s position in the Constitution is no
evidence whatsoever of Congress’s view of its importance, and given
the complexities of the amendment process, it can hardly be
regarded as evidence of how the states regarded it either.
WILLIAM V. DUNLAP30
13
Dunlap: A Living Constitution and a Living Bill of Rights
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2007
Amendment II
A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a
free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms,
shall not be infringed.
The Second Amendment is one of the few provisions of the Bill
of Rights that has not been incorporated against the states. As a
result, it does not protect citizens against state gun-control laws,
only federal. It has not come before the Supreme Court very often,
but when it does the court has upheld Congress's authority to
regulate the ownership and sales of firearms.
One well-known case that struck down a federal gun-control
law had nothing to do with the Second Amendment. United States
v. Lopez,37 the 1999 case that invalidated the federal Guns in
School Act, involved a question of Congress’s power to regulate
interstate commerce. The court held that possession of a gun in a
school zone was not interstate commerce, and that it did not have
a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and therefore was
beyond the power of Congress to regulate. If that case had
anything to do with the Bill of Rights, it was in the Court’s
reliance on the Tenth Amendment in finding that the federal law
making it a crime to possess a gun in a school zone infringed upon
the power of the states to determine what conduct is criminal
within its own boundaries.
There is considerable debate over the meaning of the Second
Amendment and whether it confers any individual rights or
whether it simply grants states an immunity from federal gun
control laws. One Court of Appeals, the Fifth Circuit, has
concluded, in language that was utterly irrelevant to the outcome of
the case and therefore not part of the holding, that the amendment
confers an individual right.38 Another circuit, the Tenth, focusing on
the amendment’s introductory language, has held that the right is a
collective one and that to violate it a federal law would have to
impair the states ability to maintain a militia.39
A LIVING CONSTITUTION AND A LIVING BILL OF RIGHTS 31
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Original intent is a major tool in crafting arguments about the
scope of the Second Amendment, but one might want to ask: When
the framers, in 1791, spoke of the right to keep and bear arms, did
they mean automatic rifles, assault weapons, rocket launchers, and
hand grenades?
So far, the Supreme Court has never held that the Second
Amendment creates or finds an individual right to keep and bear
arms, but we can be reasonably certain that it will remain a
contentious issue into the foreseeable future.
Amendment III
No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but
in a manner to be prescribed by law.
The Third Amendment too has never been incorporated by the
Supreme Court to apply against the states. If such a case were ever
to come before it, the court would surely find, as one Court of
Appeals has done, that the amendment covers the state militia as
well as the United States Army.40
Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches
and seizures and imposes fairly strict requirements for the issuance
of a search warrant. It is a constant source of litigation, particularly
since the development of the exclusionary rule that prohibits
WILLIAM V. DUNLAP32
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prosecutors from using evidence unconstitutionally obtained,41 and
Mapp v. Ohio,42 which extended the exclusionary rule to the states
as well as to the federal government. The history of the Fourth
Amendment since then has been one of a constant struggle between
defense lawyers and prosecutors as the courts try to define probable
cause and fine-tune the exceptions to the rule—such as when an
honest mistake by the police will justify using evidence ordinarily
excludable. If you learned your criminal procedure the same way I
did—by watching Law & Order—you are already familiar with
defense challenges to the admissibility of evidence because the
police failed to follow judicially established procedures for
obtaining warrants based on probable cause that a crime has been
committed.
Fourth Amendment cases are an instructive example of the
problem with original intent as opposed to a living, developing Bill
of Rights. The Fourth Amendment speaks of protecting persons,
houses, papers, and effects. It says nothing of telephone
conversations, e-mail, or electronic eavesdropping on face-to-face
conversations. The omission is hardly surprising, as the founding
fathers had no inkling of the technology that would begin to
revolutionize communications just a few decades after the Bill of
Rights was adopted.
The USA Patriot Act, particularly the current negotiations in
Congress over renewing the sunset provisions, has brought search
and seizure and the Fourth Amendment into the public
consciousness as never before.43 Among the controversial provisions
are statutory authorization for trap and trace technology,44 pen
registers,45 and roving wiretaps46 that allow investigators to follow an
individual from phone to phone, instead of having to obtain a new
warrant every time a person under investigation changes
telephones—a much more common practice in the age of
disposable cellular phones. These all raise serious Fourth
Amendment issues, but many people would probably be surprised
how long some of these practices have been going on, long before
the Patriot Act brought them to public attention.
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Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of
war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
The Fifth Amendment deals with a broad range of rights, most
of them concerning defendants in criminal cases. The most famous
is probably the right against self-incrimination. We popularly call it
“taking the Fifth,” and someone invokes it every evening on some
television police show. This right, and the relatively recent
obligation of the police to inform suspects of it at the time of
arrest—“You have a right to remain silent. Anything you say may be
used against you in a court of law.”—is one of the most important
rights that American citizens have against their law-enforcement
agencies.
Today, however, we are going to mention one of the lesser-
known clauses of the Fifth Amendment, the Takings Clause—“nor
shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation.” By its terms, it says simply that if government takes
private property it has to pay a fair price for it. By implication,
however, in conjunction with the due process clause, it prohibits
government from taking private property for anything other than
a public use.47 Taking property for private use—buying it from
one person to give or sell it to another person—would be so far
beyond the bounds of appropriate governmental behavior that
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This is what Connecticut’s famous Kelo case is about.48 The
New London Development Corporation wants to clear a large tract
of land along Long Island Sound and redevelop it into a park, hotel
and conference center, and other commercial and research facilities.
The primary goal is to develop the area economically and to make
it more desirable for one of the region’s largest employers, Pfizer
Pharmaceuticals, to remain in New London. Suzette Kelo and
fourteen other property owners (out of 115) refused to sell, and the
city invoked its power of eminent domain. Kelo challenged the city’s
authority, in state court and then up to the United States Supreme
Court, arguing that turning her property, her home, over to a
private developer was not a public use within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment. The power of eminent domain is typically used
to make room for public projects—highways, schools, airports.
More and more, however, municipalities have been using it to
assemble parcels to allow private development, such as shopping
centers and industrial parks. The courts have routinely upheld states
and cities authority to do this sort of thing, but always in the
context of removing slums and blight. Suzette Kelo’s neighborhood
was no slum. She argued that economic development, in and of
itself, was not a public use that would allow government to take her
property, even for a fair price. Is it fair, she essentially asked, to allow
the government to turn her home over to someone else who might
simply have a more profitable use for it?
The court did what most observers, I think, expected it to do:
defer to the government’s determination of what constitutes fair use.
It did that in 1954 in Berman v. Parker,49 where the District of
Columbia was putting together a redevelopment parcel in a blighted
neighborhood, and in Midkiff v. Hawaii,50 where it allowed the state
government to require the Bishop Trust, established for the benefit
of the native Hawaiians, to sell its extensive holdings to tenants, in
an effort to break up what the state regarded as the trust’s
stranglehold on the real estate market.
The United States Supreme Court’s Kelo decision last spring
triggered one of the more bizarre attacks on the court.
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Commentator after commentator, particularly political
conservatives, the very people who have been purporting for years
to favor states’ rights and oppose judicial activism, excoriated the
court for not reining in state power. This case, regrettable as though
the outcome may be to many, is a perfect example of judicial
restraint: the Supreme Court deferring to the judgment of
democratically elected officials acting under the authority of state
law. If you sympathize with Suzette Kelo (and it is hard not to when
you see her highly personalized house and garden, perched on a rock
above Fort Trumbull and overlooking New London Harbor and
Long Island Sound) and you want to look for villains (and who
doesn’t these days?), then the villains are the New London
Development Corporation, the New London City Council that
authorized the use of eminent domain, and the Connecticut
Legislature, whose laws authorized the city to act in this fashion
(cities in Connecticut have no authority to do anything not
authorized by state law). All the United States Supreme Court did
was exactly what right-wing critics have been advocating for years;
Kelo was a case of the federal government deferring to state law, and
of unelected and politically unaccountable judges deferring to
democratically elected officials.
Our democratically elected officials in Hartford appear to be
getting the message. The New London Development Corporation
issued eviction notices shortly after the Supreme Court decision,
while negotiations were still going on, and Governor Rell stepped in
last week and “encouraged” the corporation to withdraw the
notices. Meanwhile the Connecticut Legislature has taken up
consideration of a law that would rescind the New London evictions
and prohibit future takings for the purpose of “economic
development.” Some states have already enacted such laws in
response to Kelo. It is, as the court reminded us, ultimately a
question of state law, and ultimately a question for the legislature,
not the courts.
Perhaps the most important lesson of Kelo is that the courts are
not always the last resort in protecting individual rights. We have a
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federal system in which powers are allocated between the federal
and state governments, and on each of those levels complex systems
of separation of powers and of checks and balances help to prevent
abuse of power. Sometimes voters have as much influence in the
system as lawyers do. Sometimes.
Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel
for his defense.
It has been hard to read the Sixth Amendment since 2001
without thinking about Guantanamo Bay and the so-called “War
on Terror.” Virtually every provision of the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantees of a fair trial is called into question. Speedy trial? The
government has made clear that many of those prisoners will remain
at Guantanamo indefinitely, even after the military has conceded
that some of them, perhaps many, have no connection whatever to
the terrorists we are fighting. Public trial? Confronted with
witnesses against him? Compulsory process for obtaining witnesses?
What witnesses?
Even though one clause or another of the Sixth Amendment
will be implicated at almost every stage of the Guantanamo
litigation, you will not necessarily hear it mentioned that
prominently. This is because the focus for some time will be not on
specific protections but on whether the United States Constitution
even applies to detainees in Guantanamo. It is fairly clear to me that
if the empowerment provisions of the Constitution—the ones that
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grant the president the power to establish a base in a foreign
country and maintain a prison camp there—apply in
Guantanamo, then the limitations on his power, the Bill of
Rights, apply there as well. I do not believe that the government
can pick and choose among the constitutional provisions it thinks
should apply. Cafeteria constitutionalism. How the courts decide
this, and how the president complies, will play a major role in
shaping the world’s view of the United States as a protector of
human rights and individual liberties as well as a great military
power.
“You have a right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an
attorney, one will be provided for you by the court.” The Miranda
warning. You’ve heard it a hundred times on television. Not that
often in person, I hope. This derives from the Sixth Amendment:
“The accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense.”
Right to counsel is the only affirmative right in the Bill of
Rights, or in the whole Constitution, for that matter. All the others
are negative rights, or what legal philosophers would call privileges.
Take the freedom of speech, for example. We have the right, loosely
speaking, to use public places like parks and sidewalks for public
expression. The government may be able to place reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions on this expression—no bullhorns in
a residential area after 9 P.M. (Just the day before yesterday, Cindy
Sheehan’s antiwar rally in New York City was broken up by police,
and her local organizer was charged with using a loudspeaker
without a permit.51) But government may not exclude all expression
from traditional public forums, and it may not discriminate on the
basis of content—allowing speech of which it approves and
prohibiting or restricting speech of which it disapproves or which
may be unpopular. So, to use a classic example, if you want to set
up a soap box in the park or on the street corner, you have that
right. But if you don't have your own soapbox and you can’t afford
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A soapbox may seem a trivial example, but this question of
rights and privileges is what the media critic A.J. Liebling had in
mind when he said that freedom of the press belongs to those who
own one.52 Very true in the days when mass communication
required a press or a transmitter. Today, the Internet and listservs
and particularly blogs allow almost anyone in this country—or for
that matter in the developed world—to create a media presence and
get a point of view before the world. More than ever, we truly have
a marketplace of ideas, and the competition is intense. As in any
other marketplace, some of the goods are truly shoddy. The rule—
actually the practice, because there are no rules—is caveat emptor
(let the buyer beware), and those cruising the net for ideas have an
obligation to themselves and to society to develop critical
faculties—the critical thinking skills that will allow them to travel
this unmapped information superhighway without crashing and
burning. So freedom of speech and freedom of the press are what we
would call negative rights, or privileges. We may engage in them if
we want, and government has no authority to prevent us, but it also
has no obligation to help us out.
Abortion is another example. The case of Roe v. Wade53 found in
1973 that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
contained a right to privacy that included what popularly became
known as a right to an abortion. A few years later, the state of
Connecticut refused to pay, through Medicaid, for elective
abortions, those not indicated for medical reasons. An expectant
mother who was receiving Medicaid benefits and could not afford
an abortion sued, arguing that this refusal violated her right under
Roe v. Wade to an abortion. The court rejected this argument,
invoking the right/privilege distinction and finding that Roe, as its
language had always made clear, merely established a right or
privilege for a woman, in consultation with her physician and
without undue governmental interference, to choose to have an
abortion. The state had no obligation to provide or pay for one.
Affirmative rights, on the other hand, are those that
government has a correlative duty to provide. In a strict analysis of
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rights, privileges, and duties, no one has a right unless someone
else—in our discussion, the government—has a duty to provide it.
If what you enjoy is merely a freedom to do something—such as
speak, or exercise your religion, or choose to have an abortion—
then it is not a right but a privilege, with which government may
not interfere. The Sixth Amendments right to counsel is a true
right. The government has a duty to provide legal assistance, and
this actually costs the government money, because those lawyers
have to be paid.
Until relatively recently, the right to counsel was only a negative
right as well. If a defendant wanted to be represented by a lawyer,
the government could not prevent it. Only since the notorious
Scottsboro Boys case in 1932 have states been required to provide
lawyers in capital cases.54 In 1963, it was extended, in Gideon v.
Wainwright, to all state felony trials.55 Today it is a well recognized
right that we mostly take for granted.
Our Constitution is loaded with negative rights and virtually
lacking affirmative rights. One of the things you might want to
think about or discuss is why that should be so.56
Amendment VII
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
reexamined in any court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.
This is another of the few Bill of Rights provisions not
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, leaving the states
free to alter the rules and experiment with civil trials. We inherited
our legal system from England at the time of the War of
Independence and the adoption of the Constitution. Our system
has changed dramatically since then, and so has England’s, often in
different directions. It has been years now since England did away
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with jury trials in civil matters, with the exception of libel cases and
a few others. England made that change by statute. In this country,
it would take a constitutional amendment on the federal level, but
by not incorporating the Seventh Amendment, the Constitution
leaves the states free to experiment as England has done, looking for
ways to achieve social justice in more efficient ways.
Amendment VIII
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
There is a good chance that we will be hearing a great deal
about the Eighth Amendment in the next few years in the wake of
Michael Ross's execution. In May 2005, Connecticut became the
first New England state in forty years to impose capital punishment.
Opponents of capital punishment tried to persuade the legislature
to intervene and repeal the death penalty before the execution could
occur, but this was politically unrealistic. Michael Ross's crimes
were so horrendous that many people normally opposed to capital
punishment sat this one out. The fact that he was a well-educated,
middle-class white man removed the case from the usual argument
that the death penalty is disproportionally imposed on blacks, other
racial minorities, and the poor. The fact that he admitted his guilt
in the face of incontrovertible evidence eliminated the perennial
concern about caprice and mistake.
Now that the execution is over, it is quite likely that in a few
years the Legislature will look at the issue again. It is unlikely to raise
any Eighth Amendment or due process issues, because the federal
constitutional standards are spelled out clearly enough that any state
legislature not making a conscious effort to push the boundaries will
have no problem meeting constitutional requirements. In the
meantime, death penalty litigants will continue to push their attacks
in the courts. So far the Supreme Court has held that states may not
execute the mentally retarded,57 or those who were under sixteen
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when they committed the crime.58 Eventually, many hope, the court
will prohibit capital punishment altogether.
Amendment IX
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people.
The Ninth Amendment sounds totally innocuous, but it has an
interesting history and a stormy present. Its future may well lie with
John Roberts, the new chief justice of the United States.
While the Constitution was being drafted, there was an
intense debate over whether there should even be a Bill of
Rights to protect individual liberties against governmental
oppression. Some thought it essential. Some opposed it, for
either of two reasons: that the national government was a
government of limited powers, restricted to matters of
nationwide concern; and that there was nothing in its
delegated powers that would allow it to infringe on individual
liberties. In this view, it was the states, which possessed the
police power and regulated the daily lives of individuals, that
should be constrained by Bills of Rights, as they were. In the
other view, having a Bill of Rights, especially an unnecessary
one, could actually have the effect of repressing individual
liberties. This was the eighteenth century, and the framers were
infected with the liberalism of that era—that people are
endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, and
that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
To them, rights and liberties were not granted by government;
they were part and parcel of being human. Among these
framers were those who feared that a Bill of Rights that
specified, or enumerated, certain specific rights would become
the basis of an argument that any right not listed was not a
right at all. Knowing that it would be impossible to cover every
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contingency, they argued that it would be better not to have
any Bill of Rights at all.
Eventually those demanding a Bill of Rights prevailed, and the
Constitution was adopted on the understanding that the
protections would be added shortly. To address the concerns of the
natural rights faction, the Ninth Amendment was included to
preclude the argument that because a particular right—say,
privacy—was not enumerated in the Bill of Rights, it was not a right
retained by the people. The Ninth Amendment is a living argument
for a living Constitution.
Justices Douglas and Goldberg relied heavily on it in their
opinions in Griswold v. Connecticut,59 which invalidated a
Connecticut law making it a crime to prescribe or use
contraceptives. They found, applying different theories but coming
to the same conclusion, that the Bill of Rights contained a right of
privacy that was broad enough to protect a married couple’s decision
to use contraceptives, whether to protect the health of the woman,
or simply for family planning reasons. The rationale was soon
extended to unmarried persons, and in 1973 it was expanded to
cover a woman’s choice to have an abortion. Last year, in a case
called Lawrence v. Texas,60 the Court overruled itself61 and held that
state laws criminalizing homosexual sodomy also infringe
unconstitutionally on this right of privacy. Other constitutional
provisions came into all these decisions, as well, but it is the Ninth
Amendment that provides the underpinnings of the argument that
just because the Constitution does not mention privacy does not
mean that it is not a right deserving of judicial protection.
Contraceptives, abortion, homosexual sodomy. The uses to
which recent courts have put the Ninth Amendment raise charges
of judicial activism, a label that conservatives typically pin on judges
they regard as too liberal. Judicial activism, though, is not a
conservative/liberal question. The most famous era of judicial
activism in the Supreme Courts history was between 1897 and
1938 and has come to be called the Lochner era, after a famous case
in which a conservative court discovered an unenumerated freedom
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to contract in the Constitution and used it to strike down health
and safety laws in the workplace.62 That series of cases was finally
rejected during the Great Depression, only to be replaced in the
1960s by a very different kind of judicial activism, now protecting
the right to privacy, rather than the freedom of the marketplace.
When conservatives complain today about activist judges, it is
not the activism they deplore. It is the results of specific cases. The
Rehnquist Court was arguably the most activist court in Supreme
Court history. That’s not a criticism. It’s not a compliment. It’s just
a fact. It struck down more acts of Congress than any court since
the Lochner era, to protect state power against federal intrusion and
to protect executive power and judicial power against legislative
intrusion. Conservatives and states rights advocates applauded
many of these decisions, while continuing to call for an end to
activist judicial lawmaking.
Perhaps the most breathtaking stroke of judicial activism ever
was Bush v. Gore in 2000.63 The Supreme Court stepped into a
dispute over the interpretation of state law, over which it has no
jurisdiction, and applied the equal protection clause in a way that it
had disapproved of when people had tried to use it to challenge state
laws that disadvantaged blacks. Then, recognizing the implications
of this for the future of states’ rights and the court’s narrow view of
equal protection, the court simply added a sentence saying that the
case should be not used as precedent in future cases. This is a
violation of the whole concept of precedent in judicial decision-
making. Legislatures are political, and can base their decisions on
ephemeral political values or on nothing at all. Courts are supposed
to engage in principled decision-making, knowing that what they
decide today must fit into the existing legal landscape while helping
to reshape that landscape for future courts.
This commentary is a criticism not so much of the Rehnquist
Court as of so-called commentators who latch onto a catchphrase
like “activist judges” without the faintest notion of what it means,
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Amendment X
The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved
to the states respectively, or to the people.
Read and applied literally, this amendment would have no effect
on federalism, on states’ rights, or on judicial power. In fact, it would
have no effect on anything. It is, as one landmark commerce power
case, United States v. Darby, put it in 1941, a mere truism.64 It merely
restates the obvious. Why obvious? Because we have a national
government of limited powers. It was formed by the Constitution,
and it possesses only those powers granted to it by the Constitution.
The residual sovereign power in our system lies with the states, many,
but not all, of whose powers and prerogatives were transferred to the
national government by the Constitution. This was true, and well
known to be true, before the Tenth Amendment reinforced it.
Two decades after Darby, Thurgood Marshall wrote in another
case that the Tenth Amendment may be a truism but that it is not
without significance.65 Marshall’s comment comports precisely with
a well-established canon of interpretation that no word or phrase in
a document should be read in such a way as to make it meaningless.
Treating the Tenth Amendment as a truism has precisely that effect.
If it adds nothing to the text of the Constitution, why was it
adopted in the first place? The drafters must have intended it to
mean something. The Rehnquist Court was far from the first to
place great significance on the Tenth Amendment and to rely on it
to invalidate acts of Congress said to infringe upon the powers
reserved to the states. In this sense, the Tenth Amendment has little
to do with the Bill of Rights; it merely allocates authority between
the state and national governments. Nevertheless, it does have some
practical implications for individual liberties.66
I hope that a brief glance at the first ten amendments and the
Fourteenth (which makes most of the others applicable to the states)
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makes clear that we have a living Bill of Rights, in the sense that it
is in play today and every day. In the other sense of the phrase, I
hope I have persuaded you that we have a Living Constitution. As
Jack Balkin, a Yale law professor, told NPR’s listeners just a few
weeks ago, We are all Living Constitutionalists now. But only some
of us are willing to admit it.”67
Like it or not, we have a Living Constitution and have had one
at least since John Marshall’s court decided McCulloch v. Maryland
in 1819: “We must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding, . . . a constitution, intended to endure for ages to
come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs.”68
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